|
Functional families are crucial for the raising of children
and the stability of society.
What is happening with families?
While the family continues as a human
aspiration, there have been a series of changes in family patterns throughout
the industrialised world that point to a decline in marriage and a weakening of
family life. At the first World Congress of Families in 1997, I summarised these
patterns:
•
People are marrying less;
•
Those couples who marry do so at an older age;
•
There has been a dramatic increase in divorce;
•
The number of children involved in divorce has
continued to grow since the early 1970s;
•
The rates of remarriage have fallen over the
past 20 years;
•
Families are having fewer children;
•
The proportion of children born out of wedlock
has increased dramatically;
•
There has been a marked increase in the
proportion of single parent families;
•
Families increasingly have both parents in the
paid workforce; and
•
In most nations, the population is ageing.[1]
“All of these changes are having a
profound impact on families,” I said. “Taken together, the statistics appear to
reveal the steady displacement of a marriage culture with a culture of divorce
and single parenthood.”
A decade later, it is timely to
review these trends. As the appended charts indicate, generally birth rates and
marriage rates have continued to fall, pre-marital cohabitation has become the
norm in most countries, the median age of first marriage has risen, divorce
rates have increased, out-of-wedlock births have grown, as has the proportion of
sole-parent families, and the population continues to age. [See appendices]
The rates of change vary from country
to country, including some welcome reversals in some places. However, the
deinstitutionalisation of marriage and the consequent trends for less stable
families remains significant.
The policy response to date
While there is still considerable
debate about the cause and impact of these trends, an increasing number of
scholars and policy makers have recognised the challenges facing most nations.
Few people in western nations would
dispute that life is more uncertain for our children then a generation ago. The
renowned scholar of family studies, Urie Bronfenbrenner commented: “There has
been a progressive disarray at an accelerating rate since World War 11 of the
disorganisation of the family in the western world.”[2]
His remarks reflected the conclusion of the sociologist, David Popenoe, that
there has been a significant decline in ‘familism’ by which he means the family
is becoming weaker as an institution.[3]
For Popenoe and others[4]
an interesting question is why so many sociologists “think of family decline as
a myth and seek to dismiss the idea with such vigour and seeming uncertainty.”[5]
Part of the reason lies with the cultural ideals of individualism, sexual
freedom, and social tolerance, as well as the obvious gains in health and wealth
for many people. It also lies, I suggest, with two manifestations of modern
discussion. One is the concept of “wishful thinking” and the other a tendency
for the anecdotal to trump the empirical. I will return to these themes later.
What the data reveals however are
trends affecting families which require an effective social response to avoid
the further fragmentation of families and communities, and the alienation of
individuals. Despite the global expansion that lifted many people from poverty,
many remain trapped in poor circumstances. The second is the chaos created when
day to day stability and predictability are lost in family life, particularly
for children. The latter trend affects rich and poor alike.
The responses to date fall into four
categories.[6]
Countering ageing
Policy makers have generally adopted
three approaches to the ageing of their populations, namely increasing
immigration, pronatalist inducements, and family-friendly measures.
Immigration
Faced with the cultural trends of
later and fewer marriages, smaller and more unstable families, governments have
resorted to immigration to ameliorate the impact of ageing populations. During
the past two decades, significant population movements have occurred, generally
from less developed and less prosperous nations to richer ones. Driven by labor
force shortages, governments first sought to attract increasing numbers of
younger, skilled immigrants while maintaining or decreasing the proportion of
older family members seeking to reunite with their emigrant children.
Skilled workers, and in particular
the human capital they possess, are in high demand in many OECD countries. The
competition is immense, with countries such as the UK, US and Canada all
operating skilled and economic migration programmes.
The UK has recently adopted a points
based system for skilled migrants. This system is be based on the Australian
points based system, which focuses on more effectively targeting foreign workers
who have skills that are genuinely in demand.
In Canada, a ratio of 60/40 economic
and humanitarian migration has been maintained since the early 1990’s, with a
points based system also applying to skilled migration, and a particular premium
placed on tertiary education.
And in the United States, which has
historically had an abundance of low and unskilled workers coming across the
border from Mexico, the Senate in 2005 voted to increase the cap on skilled
visas.
As labor shortages grew, many
countries extended their programs to the unskilled as well. Some also turned a
blind eye to unlawful immigration, as potential immigrants eyed the economic
benefits readily attainable in more prosperous nations.
The Australian Treasury argued that
the ageing of the population and higher fertility over the next 35 years would
bring down per–capita gross domestic product by more than two per cent. But this
would be partly offset by a 0.75 per cent through migrant intake alone, and by a
further 0.5 per cent through the age composition of the migrants.[7]
However this claim requires more
investigation. A House of Lords Committee[8]
asserted in 2008 that “overall GDP is an irrelevant and misleading criterion for
assessing the economic impacts of immigration.” The Committee argued that the
focus of analysis should rather be on the effects of immigration on income per
head of the resident population. By this measure, immigration to Australia, for
example, has a very modest impact on living standards according to an Econtech
report.[9]
The longitudinal survey of migrants
show very strong employment outcomes for skilled migrants with an employment
rate of over 97 per cent and a participation rate of 94 per cent just 18 months
after arrival. Migrants on a spouse visa also have very good outcomes, with
unemployment of just five per cent, and participation at 72 per cent. However,
there are significant variations. Non-English speaking, unskilled and older
migrants have much lower levels of employment. This will be exacerbated by the
global recession.
There are other limitations on
immigration. Settlement issues, especially in larger cities like Sydney and
Melbourne in Australia, effectively cap likely increases. A worldwide demand for
skilled immigrants also restricts the numbers. Moreover, at numbers of about
100,000 per year, immigration does little to influence the age structure of the
population, as immigrants also grow older.
Thirdly, the assumptions about
population increase over the next 50 years take little account of any possible
reversals of life expectancy. As Nicholas Eberstat observed recently: “Long-term
stagnation or even decline in life expectancy is now a real possibility for
urbanised, educated countries not at war. Severe and prolonged collapses of
local health conditions during peacetime, furthermore, is no longer a purely
theoretical eventuality. As we look towards 2025, we must consider the
unpleasant likelihood that a large and growing fraction of humanity may be
separated from the planetary march toward better health and subjected instead to
brutal mortality crises of indeterminate duration.”[10]
In the west, cancer, diabetes,
alcoholism and other diseases related to affluent but unhealthy lifestyles
continue to strike the population. Obesity amongst children is at record levels.
Finally, population issues cannot be
isolated from other national trends, including lower levels of marriage, the
higher incidence of separation and divorce, and the consequences for children.
Immigration therefore is a lazy, and,
ultimately limited, response to the ageing of the population.
First, changing economic
circumstances can result in migration reversals. The exodus of recent migrants
from eastern Europe in one example. Elsewhere, guest workers are being sent back
to their home countries as economic conditions fluctuate.[11]
Secondly, although generally younger,
the new arrivals also age along with the rest of the population. Only a
commitment to a continually larger immigration program can counter this fact. A
record annual number of immigrants would be necessary, for example, if Europe
was to counter the impact of ageing.[12]
This would result in greater congestion and more dense settlement, neither of
which would be popular.
According to UN estimates, the
magnitude of immigration required to prevent population ageing in Europe would
result in a migrant population constituting between 59 and 99 per cent of the
population.[13]
Even if theoretically feasible, where would these immigrants come from, and what
would be the impact on the existing resident population? We have already
witnessed tensions in a number of countries between existing populations and
more recent arrivals from other parts of the world. Little wonder that a recent
survey of fertility and population ageing in Europe concluded that “the sheer
numbers of immigrants that are needed to prevent population ageing in the EU and
its Member States are not acceptable in the current socio-political climate
prevailing in Europe.”[14]
Debates over identity are likely to increase, not decrease, in this century.[15]
Pronatalist inducements
A number of countries have offered
direct incentives to couples who have children and disincentives to those who
choose not to. These approaches include cash payments for each child, privileged
access to state housing, medical or education services, and taxation incentives
or disincentives related to children.[16]
During the past century, a range of
direct pronatalist policies were implemented in various countries, ranging from
restrictions on family planning and abortion in Romania and Hungary to financial
incentives to have more children elsewhere. While the availability of
contraception is widely recognised as one of the causes of the decline in
fertility across the EU,[17]the
impact of restrictive legislation would appear to have only a temporary impact
on birthrates.[18]
A survey of global policies suggests
that while it is relatively easy to reduce national birthrates, it is very
difficult to reverse a decline. Singapore provides a good case study.
Case Study: Singapore
From the late 1950s, the island state
adopted a strong antinatalist program of legalised abortion, voluntary
sterilisation and disincentives to have more than two children. The total
fertility rate fell from 6.56 in 1957 to just 1.42 in 1986.[19]
By the early eighties, the national government became alarmed about the trend.
With falling fertility, especially among better educated women, the government
expressed concern about the “quality” of the population.[20]
It subsequently introduced measures to encourage more births, including
privileged access to high-quality education, income tax relief, childcare leave
and subsidies, part-time work rights in the public service, and housing
entitlements.[21]
While the total fertility rate had increased to 1.6 by 1997, it remained below
replacements levels. A subsequent decline was a concern to the government.
In 2001, the New York Times featured
the headline: ‘Singapore, Hoping for a Baby boom, Makes Sex a Civic Duty.’ The
report continued:
Here in
straight-laced Singapore, it’s the new patriotism: have sex. Alarmed by its
declining birthrate, this tiny city-state of just four million people is urging
its citizens to multiply as fast as they can. “We need more babies!” proclaimed
Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong last fall. The world, he said, is in danger of
running short of Singaporeans.[22]
A government office, the Working
Committee on Marriage and Procreation, has developed monetary and workplace
incentives. The idea is to persuade Singaporeans that having children is
a better deal than going without. In what it calls the Baby Bonus Scheme, the
government is offering cash to couples who have second and third children. It is
extending maternity leave and adding a brief paternity leave for government
workers. It is experimenting with flexible working hours to make child rearing
easier. It is offering special deals on apartment rentals for young couples.
“Let’s get on the love wagon” urged a
headline in the Straits Times. For a nation where dropping litter or spitting on
the footpath is regarded as disorderly, it comes as a surprise to read in the
same article tips for having sex in the back seat of a car with directions to
“some of the darkest, most secluded and most romantic spots for Romeos and
Juliets.”
Subsequently, Singapore’s Deputy
Prime Minister, Dr Tony Tan, announced that the Government would fund $50
million over five years to educate the public on family life. This includes
marriage education and parenting classes.
Despite these endeavours, Singapore’s
fertility rate has fallen to 1.28 according to the latest data.[23]
The Singapore study illustrates the
point that whereas the birthrate can be reduced significantly within the space
of a generation, it is much more difficult to increase again. Direct pronatalist
measures alone seem insufficient to reverse declining birthrates. For this
reason, policy makers also have turned to family friendly and economic policies.
Economic support for families
Most governments have sought to
provide economic support for families. Using the rhetoric of ‘family friendly
policies’, measures range from direct taxation and social security benefits, to
parental leave, and flexible working hours. These policies often serve the twin
objectives of encouraging fertility and supporting families to raise children.
A central response is the economic,
which involves a recognition of the desirability of higher fertility rates in
the western world; the additional costs of raising children; and the advantages
to individuals and society of life-long marriages.
It is also an important recognition
that two economies exist within nations: the market economy, where exchanges
take place through money and where competition and efficiency drive decisions;
and the home economy, where exchanges take place through the altruistic sharing
of goods and services among family members.
Direct economic support for
families
Australia provides a case study for
examining the impact of economic measures on family life.
Case Study: Australia
In the past decade Australian
governments raised the tax free threshold - that is, the level of income before
tax is paid - for families with children, especially for families with one
parent at home.
The Australian Government's Family
Tax Initiative initially increased the tax-free threshold by $1000 for each
dependent child up to the age of 16 and each dependent secondary student up to
18 years. In addition, single income families including sole parents receive a
further $2,500 increase in their tax-free threshold if they have a child under
five. For a single income family of three children, one of whom is under five
years, the tax free threshold is almost doubled.
The taxation reform package passed by
the Parliament in 1999 built on these initiatives. Apart from reductions in
personal income taxes, and the increase and simplification of family benefits,
the tax-free threshold increases under the Family Tax Initiative were doubled.
From July 1, 2000, all single income families, including sole parents, with one
child under 5 years have an effective tax free threshold of $13,000, more than
double the new general threshold of $6,000. This is a modest recognition of
parents who choose to stay at home with young children.
The government subsequently
introduced significant family tax benefits. The effect of these payments is that
for a family earning less than about $42,000 per year, there is a net
contribution by the government to them, after taking into account taxes and
benefits. In addition, the previous government introduced a baby bonus, which is
a payment of $5,000 on the birth of a child. Parents also receive childcare
subsidies, depending upon their level of income.
More recently, the government has
proposed the introduction of a paid parental leave scheme.
While it is too early to claim
conclusively that there is a causal connection between these measures and the
stability of families in Australia, recent data is encouraging. The long-term
decline in the birth rate appears to have been arrested and has risen slightly
to 1.91. The Productivity Commission concluded that despite the negative impact
on birth rates of rising house prices and the high levels of female
participation in higher education and the paid workforce, a combination of a
prosperous economy and specific policies contributed to the upturn in fertility
in recent years.[24]
The marriage rate has risen in the
past five years, and the divorce rate has fallen, again reversing long-term
trends. However, the marriage rate remains significantly lower – and the
divorce rate significantly higher – than it was two decades ago.
Case Study: France
Faced with secular fertility decline
a century before the rest of the West,[25]
France has had a long history of support for families. During the past 30 years,
the nation has introduced a series of measures, including unpaid leave (1977),
special assistance for low and single –income families (1979-80), housing
privileges for larger families (1980),benefits for women with three or more
children (1985), and extended parental leave (1987 and 1994).[26]
Although some measures have since
been varied - for example extending social legislation to unmarried couples
(1998) -or limited, and some such as the 35 hour week and employment protection
arguably restrict employment, France has generous family provisions.
In particular, France has a
deliberate third child policy. Whereas Australia, for example, pays a bonus on
the birth of each child, France pays a greater amount for third and subsequent
children. This is in addition to parental and maternity leave and childcare and
family allowances.
The combination of these policies
would appear to have had a mixed impact. The birth rate has stabilised at around
1.9, the second highest in Europe (after Ireland). However, other indicators of
marital and family health have declined. The marriage rate has fallen from 7.8
in 1970 to 4.4 in 2006; the divorce rate has risen from 2.05 in 1995 to 2.3 in
2006; Out-of-wedlock births have jumped from 11.4 per cent in 1980 to over 50
per cent by 2006; and the proportion of single-parent families has almost
doubled to 19.8 per cent since 1980.
Work and family measures
It is often claimed that generous
provisions that enable women to enter and remain in the paid workforce
contribute to higher fertility levels. Hence Hugo argues that “the international
ranking of countries according to their fertility levels matches their ranking
on the extent to which they facilitate the employment of mothers in the paid
workforce and the extent to which a degree of gender equity applies within the
family itself.”[27]
Other researchers have reached similar conclusions.[28]
The Scandinavian countries are often
cited in this respect. However the approaches have differed amongst the northern
European nations.
Case Study: Sweden
Beginning in the 1930s, Sweden
introduced policies that enabled women to maintain their position in the paid
workforce whilst having children.[29]
In the 1980s, the fertility rate climbed to 2.02, leading some commentators to
conclude that the reversal was due to the cumulative impact if public daycare,
child benefits, parental leave, parent’s rights to part time work and other
measures.[30]
These views were reinforced as female labour force participation soared to 81
per cent[31]
and the birth rate rose above replacement levels. The growth was temporary,
falling to the lowest rate ever for the country of 1.52 by the end of the
century.[32]
It would appear that the birth rate related to the economic cycle, and the
impact of the so-called “speed premium” whereby parents were entitled to the
same income replacement for a second child born within 30 months of their first,
irrespective of the level of income between the two births.[33]
The policy would appear to have resulted in births being brought forward, rather
than a permanent increase in the number.
Other measures of family stability in
Sweden reveal trends found elsewhere. Cohabitation before marriage is
commonplace. More than half of children are born out-of-wedlock. The divorce
rate has fallen slightly in recent years.
Case Study: Norway
Another approach is the policy of the
Norwegian Government to pay parents the same amount that childcare centres or
kindergartens receive in state subsidies - approximately $US 6,000 per year per
child – which enables parents a choice about staying at home with children up to
the age of three years.
Further initiatives are necessary to
address the competing pressures between family and work in our modern societies.
As Janne Haaland Matlary, the former Norwegian Secretary of State, has written:
In order to
strengthen families and have a sustainable population, there is a need for
policies that give parents flexibility, time, and an ability to combine
child-rearing and careers. At a time when women are as well, or better, educated
than men, it is completely unrealistic to expect them to stay at home in longer
periods of their lives.[34]
If the work of Catherine Hakim
[35] is correct, then Norway’s approach better reflects that
choice that parent’s desire. In Australia, for example, most child care is
provided informally, by other family members and friends, but this is not
subsidised by the state.
If this analysis of family – work
choices is correct , policies that impact upon the 60 per cent or more of women
who are adaptive in their work-family lifestyles are the most likely to provide
the choice that families desire. Hakim rightly argues that the role of
government is not to favour any of these families. The goal is government
neutrality towards all families.
Policy approaches
These observations suggest a number
of policy approaches. First, parents should have flexibility and choice in their
family and work arrangements. Such choice is not just about the hours worked at
any one time, but about the arrangements they make over the course of their
lives. While a library of books have been written about the so-called Time Bind,
to adopt Arlie Russell Hochschild’s well-known title, little has been written
about the work-family balance over the life course.
The emphasis on short-term paid
maternity leave for those in the workforce ignores the reality that parents
balance their family and work responsibilities between them over decades, not
just a few weeks after the birth of a child.
The life course approach is all the
more important with the delay in partnering, the increase in longevity and the
ageing of the population.
Secondly, financial encouragement for
having and raising children should not be work related. While many employers
offer maternity (and some paternity) provisions, and this will increase as the
growth in the workforce contracts, the responsibility for encouraging and
supporting children does not primarily rest upon them.
If children are critical to our
future, which I strongly believe they are, encouragement of parenthood and
support for families is a national responsibility. It is not primarily an issue
of work, but of children. Nor is it an issue that benefits from a ‘one size fits
all’ industrial approach. Hence, any financial benefits should be available to
families whether or not they have both parents in the paid workforce. This is
not only equitable, it recognises the fact that parents want the flexibility to
choose their family and work arrangements over the life course.
Finally, as the Early Years report to
the Ontario Government concluded, parenting is a key factor in early child
development for families at all socioeconomic levels.
Supportive
initiatives for parents should begin as early as possible - from the time of
conception - with programs of parent support and education.
These findings reinforce the need for
policies that encourage a better balance between work and parenting,
particularly when children are in the early years of life.
As to how this goal is best achieved
while balancing the needs of children and maintaining the stability of the
family remains elusive. Given the continuing high levels of marital dissolution
and divorce, policy makers have also turned their attention to family law and
marriage support.
Discouraging divorce
From time to time, policy makers have
suggested changes to the no-fault divorce laws that exist in many nations today.
Professor William Galston, President Clinton’s Domestic Policy Advisor,
suggested that there should be a modified version of no-fault divorce where
children were involved. The UK Centre for Social Justice has proposed a
“cooling-off” period at the commencement of divorce proceedings.[36]
“What is a matter of private concern
when it is on a small scale becomes a matter of public concern when it reaches
epidemic proportions,” said a senior Family Division judge, Justice Paul
Coleridge, in the UK recently.
[37] “I am not saying every broken family
produces dysfunctional children but I am saying that almost every dysfunctional
child is the product of a broken family,” he said a year earlier.[38]
Others share the concern. “Society is
dissatisfied with the way things are now,” said Ira Lurvey, past-president of
the American Bar Association Family Law Section.[39]
Apart from the personal trauma, a
number of studies have reported the significant costs resulting from separation
and divorce. In 1998, an Australian Parliamentary inquiry reported that the
direct cost to the nation was more than $3 billion a year, and as much and $6
billion when indirect costs were included.[40]
The Canadian Institute for Marriage and Family found the cost in that country to
be around $7 billion a year.[41]
The British Relationships Foundation put the cost of family breakdown at 37
billion pounds annually,[42]
while the Centre for Social Justice estimated that it was 20 billion pounds per
year.[43]
Case Study: USA
In the US, at least 20 states have
introduced bills to change divorce laws, either by extending waiting periods,
repealing no-fault divorce, mandating counselling, or encouraging pre-marriage
education. In Louisiana, the first state to pass such a law, couples can choose
between the existing marriage regime based on no-fault divorce, and a new form
of covenant marriage. The covenant marriage requires couples to swear that they
will live together forever as husband and wife. The partners must disclose to
each other ‘everything which could adversely affect’ their decision to marry.
Both must sign a notarised affidavit, swearing they have talked about the
nature, purposes and responsibilities of marriage during their premarital
counselling. They are legally required to seek marital counselling if problems
arise in their marriage.[44]
Two other states, Arkansas and Arizona, have enacted similar laws.
The primary argument for covenant
marriage is that it may lower the divorce rate, resulting in stronger, happier
marriages and more stable conditions for children. It would appear however, that
few couples are attracted to the alternative marriage model. In the first three
years of its operation in Arkansas, only 800 of the 112,000 couples who married
in the state opted for a covenant marriage.[45]
A decade after its introduction in Louisiana, fewer than five per cent of
marriages were entered under them covenant model.[46]
Overall the uptake of covenant marriage is less than two per cent across the
three states.[47]
It has been suggested that covenant
marriage’s lack of mainstream popularity has to do with couples associating
constraints with it instead of attractions.[48]
Steven Nock concludes:
At the
moment, covenant marriage appeals to a small, distinct group who differ in
important ways from the average person approaching marriage. Based on evidence
we have at the moment, there is little to suggest that covenant marriage will
soon appeal to a larger more diverse population.[49]
Paradoxically, the divorce rate
increased significantly for those couples who chose to undertake marriage
counselling as part of their covenant marriage arrangements.[50]
These results suggest that the
objective of strengthening marriage and family by lowering the divorce rate is
unlikely to be achieved, at least in the foreseeable future, by the widespread
introduction of covenant marriage.
Supporting marriage
The notion of preparing for marriage
was antithetical to many in the past. “What’s wrong with old-fashioned love’ was
a commonly expressed sentiment. This was supported by a belief that marriage was
both private and natural. However rising divorce rates and family instability
led many churches, community organisations and governments to introduce programs
of marriage preparation.
Case Study: Australia
During the 1950s, Christian churches
in Australian conducted ‘Pre-Cana’ conferences for engaged couples. These
programs tended to be of one day's duration at which a Priest or Minister, and
married couples spoke to the engaged. Recognition of the need for marriage
preparation and the provision of it had been pioneered largely by the churches.
In 1920, for example, the Lambeth Conference of Bishops of the Anglican
Communion recommended that the clergy should regard it as part of their pastoral
responsibility, and by 1969 the practice became a canonical duty.[51]
In the 1940s and 50s, marriage
guidance agencies, modelled on the pattern developing in the UK, were
established in Australia.[52]
The Marriage Guidance Council had been established in the UK in 1937, the
Catholic Marriage Advisory Council in 1946, and the Family Discussion Bureau in
1948.[53]
The work of marriage guidance (as it
was then known) had been scrutinised at the end of the Second World War by the
Denning Committee, which had been established to examine "whether any (and if
so, what) machinery should be made available for the purpose of attempting a
reconciliation between the parties, either before or after proceedings had been
commenced.”[54]
In their Final Report, the Committee stated:
We have
throughout our inquiry had in mind the principle that the marriage tie is of the
highest importance in the interests of society. The unity of the family is so
important that, when parties are estranged, reconciliation should be attempted
in every case where there is a prospect of success.
The importance of couples adjusting
to differences and understanding family backgrounds was recognised when the
Australian Parliament first enacted legislation for matrimonial causes in 1959.[55]
In his Second Reading Speech on the Matrimonial Causes Act 1959, the
Attorney-General, Sir Garfield Barwick said:
I am
conscious that in the early days of married life, particularly amongst younger
people, the two personalities which had theretofore no need to consider any
one's interest or comfort but their own, must make many adjustments in
accommodation each to the other in married life.[56]
Provision was made in the Marriage
Act for grants to marriage counselling agencies for the purposes of conducting
programs of marriage preparation.[57]
The UK Committee recommended that it
should "be recognised as a function of the States to give every encouragement
and, where appropriate, financial assistance to marriage guidance as a form of
Social Service." A subsequent Home Office Committee concluded that:
. . . this
work which we believe is better left as far as possible to the initiative of
voluntary organisations and which cannot like other forms of social work be
undertaken - at any rate at the present time and without further knowledge and
experience - by official bodies.[58]
This approach was adopted in
Australia. Since 1960, the Australian Government has provided grants to both
church and secular marriage counselling and education organisations.[59]
Sir Garfield Barwick told Parliament that:
I do not hold the
view that this work can be done satisfactorily by people who make it no more than a means of livelihood. The work will best be done by those
who, as well as being trained, have a sense of vocation and who,
to a large extent, volunteer their good offices in this very
skilful and sympathetic task.[60]
The number and quality of services
gradually increased over the years along with modest increments of government
support. The work of two national umbrella bodies and a number of committed
individuals has resulted in a network of programs throughout the nation, funded
in part by participating couples and in part by the Australian government.[61]
A Parliamentary Committee reviewing divorce laws urged more funding for marriage
education in 1992.[62]
Funding was increased again following the publication of the To have and To
Hold report, which I chaired.[63]
That report found that 30 per cent of couples marrying for the first time in
Australia undertook some form of marriage education, usually an information
awareness and skills training program or a pre-marital inventory lasting in
duration between a number of hours and a number of days.[64]
The outcome of these interventions in
discussed below.
Challenges
Despite the spread and apparent
success of programs of marital education, a number of challenges remain.
Critically, in a nation where the majority of weddings are now conducted by
civil marriage celebrants,[65]most
couples participating in education programs are referred by a religious marriage
celebrant.
[66]
Secondly, far fewer couples marrying
for a second or subsequent time utilise the services. This mirrors the
experience in the US, where couples marrying for the first time are almost twice
as likely to participate in marital education (52.2 per cent compared to 29.7
per cent) although the risk of divorce is higher for subsequent marriages.[67]
How to increase participation remains
a challenge. Following the To have and to hold report, a pilot scheme of
education vouchers was introduced, and although successful, was never
implemented universally.[68]
The Australian government introduced a series of Family Relationship Centres
across the nation in 2004, following another report into child support, custody
and access to children.[69]
Designed to offer early, practical intervention for couples before conflict
became entrenched,[70]
the Centres theoretically embrace education as well as counselling and mediation
services. However it remains to be seen whether they will serve any purpose
beyond the conciliation of marital separation.
Finally there remain concerns about
the ability of the marriage education providers to attract sufficient personnel.
While the providers charge a fee for service in addition to government
subsidies, most educators work on a part-time, sessional or voluntary basis.
Case Study: USA
Measures to support marriage and
family have been promoted in the United States over the past two decades. During
the 1980s and 90s, governments of both political persuasions concentrated on
welfare reform in an effort to overcome the pernicious effect of long term
dependence on the stability of families, particularly the prospects for
children. Led by family scholars from the beginning of the 1990s, the nation’s
attention, including that of key policy makers, increasingly turned to the
critical role of marital and family stability for the prospects of both children
and adults. Building on a series of governmental[71]
and non-governmental[72]
publications over the previous two decades, national and state policy focussed
on initiatives to promote and support marriage.
The US government under the Bush –
Clinton – Bush Administrations gradually focussed more attention on the growing
concerns about family instability, especially the impact on children. Wade Horn,
a president of the Fatherhood Foundation, served as US Commission for Children
in the Bush senior administration. Hilary Clinton wrote about the issue in It
takes a village[73]
and Bill Clinton’s Domestic Policy Advisor, William Galston, suggested a
tightening of divorce legislation when children were involved.[74]
Concerned about the connection
between family breakdown, sole parenthood and poverty, US legislators endorsed a
preamble to the 1996 welfare laws that stated that “marriage is the essential
foundation of a successful society.”[75]
More significant was the development of the Healthy Marriage Initiative in 2002
by the Bush Administration. Regarded by many as the work of Wade Horn, then
Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, the Initiative had parallels with
the Australian model. Grants to various organisations, including State
government agencies and civil sector organisation, were a feature of the
Initiative.[76]
Marriage Movement
A significant factor in the renewed
focus on marriage and family is the network of individuals,[77]
scholars,[78]
researchers,[79]
think tanks,[80]
and authors[81]
that has been loosely described as ‘the marriage movement’. A series of books,
reports, seminars and conferences together with articles in the media have
popularised discussions about marriage and family. It is doubtful that the
policy programs been implemented would have occurred without this significant
leadership and contribution from civil society. It is an example of how the
groups that stand between the state and the individual can have a major impact
on pubic discussion and national action. Significantly, these groups have not
waited for government to act. Recognising the limitations of the state, and the
realm of activity that exists outside the state, they have driven the national
agenda by persuasion and activity. An important part of that activity involves
direct community action.
Community Marriage Policies
Like other countries, community
organisations of both a religious and secular constitution have offered programs
of marital education for many years in the United States. A common connection
between the UK, the US and Australia was the work of David and Vera Mace who
were closely involved in the establishment of marriage counselling in all three
nations.[82]
Their practical work,[83]
and that of other like-minded individuals, has spread throughout the nation.
While many organisations now promote
and support marriage,[84]
one of the most significant features has been the success of Community Marriage
Policies. Although many churches had implemented policies about preparing
couples for marriage,[85]
the idea of a community adopting a uniform policy had not been tried until 1985.
That year, Mike McManus, a syndicated columnist for US newspapers, urged a
gathering of pastors at Modesto, California, to adopt a common marriage policy
for their community.[86]
The following year 96 pastors, priests and a rabbi signed the first Community
Marriage Policy. The idea subsequently spread throughout California and then
nationally.
To date, 226 communities[87]
have adopted the policies which have five key components: Marriage preparation
of at least four months, including a premarital inventory and skills training;
an annual enrichment retreat for married couples; mentoring for couples with
troubled marriages; reconciliation for the separated; and support for
stepfamilies and parents in a remarriage.[88]
A study of the first 114 Community
Marriage Policies revealed reductions in the divorce rate by more than two per
cent a year, compared to the comparison counties.[89]
The authors noted that some well-implemented policies had much stronger results
than reflected in their analysis. This accords with Marriage Savers own data,
which shows that divorce rates fell nearly twice as much for cities with the
Policies.[90]
The data also revealed that cohabitation rates fell in cities which implemented
Community Marriage Policies.[91]
These outcomes commend further study
and widespread implementation of Community Marriage Policies.[92]
They also reinforce the benefits of premarital education.
A series of studies since the 1970s
have demonstrated the value of marriage education programs.[93]
More recent work has shown the effective of these programs on improving couples’
relationships.[94]
A subsequent study found that marriage education produces positive effects on
participants’ communication skills and relationship quality at both immediate
post-assessment and upon later follow-up.[95]
Marriage education has also been shown to function as a universal prevention.[96]
Some attention is also being paid to
encouraging couples to marry earlier.
Researchers have found that the
premarital experiences contributing most to the risk of marital breakdown are
having an ex-nuptial child; pre-marital cohabitation; and leaving home at an
early age.
[97]
According to Helen Glezer at the
Australian Instittue of Family Studies: “Characteristics of those who
experienced marital breakdown compared with those who have not, indicate that
like those who have cohabited, they tend to have less traditional family values,
are more egalitarian about sex roles, value children less and are more
individualistic in their family orientation than those who remain married. . . .
family background factors such as growing up in a non religious family, being
unhappy at home, leaving home at an early age and coming from a context of non
traditional family values are associated with both cohabiting prior to marriage
and marital dissolution.”
A series of studies have identified
other demographic and social characteristics that have been shown to contribute
to marital instability. These include exposure to divorce as a child;[98]
having pre-marital sex;[99]and
marrying as a teenager.[100]
Recent work suggests there is a
significant difference between marrying as a teenager versus marrying in the
early twenties.[101]
Researchers have found that the age-divorce link is most prominent for teens,
but much less significant for people in their early twenties.[102]
If true, there may be value in encouraging people to marry a little earlier than
the present trend towards the age of 30.
Before concluding, let me return to a
notion that I mentioned earlier, namely the concept of “wishful thinking” and
the tendency for the anecdotal to trump the empirical. Reading the media from
time to time leaves the impression that all is fine with marriage and family
today. Yet the research increasingly paints a very different picture. Part of
the reason, I suspect, is a wish that things are really alright, and a tendency
to avoid uncomfortable conclusions. This is compounded by a tendency to prefer
the anecdotal over the empirical in our sensate culture.
To take an example. When the most
recent University of Denver study into the impact of cohabitation was published,
it was featured in many newspapers. One example was the Brisbane Courier Mail,
which duly noted the findings, but then quoted a Brisbane couple, planning to
marry after seven years living together who “dismissed the study’s findings”.
The article featured a large colour photo of the couple.[103]
“There’s no negative impact from living together before you get married,” they
said, directly contradicting the empirical evidence.
By contrast, social scientists
increasingly worry about the current trends. Paul Amato describes the different
approaches as a conflict between the institutional and individual view of
marriage.[104]
Amato concludes that policies should support marriage and family:
One widely
replicated finding tilts the argument in favour of promarriage policies. That
is, studies consistently indicate that children raised by two happily and
continuously married parents have the best chance of developing into competent
and successful adults. . . Because we all have an interest in the well-being of
children, it is reasonable for social institutions (such as the state) to
attempt to increase the proportion of children raised by married parents with
satisfying and stable marriages.[105]
Merely decreasing the rate of divorce
is insufficient, he adds.
Let me conclude.
• Family policies have had mixed results:
– There is no “silver bullet”; and
– Family decline is difficult to reverse.
• In order to strengthen the family, we require a
combination of policies that:
– Increase the birth rate to counter ageing;
– Economically support families to have and raise
children;
– Allow parents a real choice about family and
work over their lifetime; and
– Support the work of community organisations to
educate and support couples about marriage and parenting.
The family is the hope of humanity,
not just because it is an historically ubiquitous institution, but also because
it is supported by the mounting social science research.
While we read from time to time of
sensational reports that marriage and family life is fast disappearing, a
lifelong commitment to family remains a popular aspiration, even amongst our
young people.
Marriage and family life remain the
optimal conditions for the socialisation and education of children's character
and values, without which liberal democracy cannot properly flourish. For these
reasons, we cannot ignore the trends affecting families today.
The tragedy of marriage and family
breakdown is not the billions of dollars it costs each year: It is the personal
and emotional trauma which research increasingly indicates affects many
children, even into their adulthood; and the consequent diminution of health,
educational opportunities, and well-being, including the stability of
relationships of children whose parents divorced.
If our desire is for healthy,
well-adjusted children and young people, who have every opportunity for the best
education, who can obtain employment and live fulfilling lives, and who have a
reasonable prospect of forming their own sustainable relationships - in short,
if we desire a stable and healthy society - then family remains the greatest
hope for humanity.
Our choice is clear. We can throw up
our hands in despair, unwilling or unable to purpose a solution to family
breakdown and falling fertility rates, with all the social consequences that
follow; or we can take a positive step forward, committed to the aspiration so
many people share, in the hope that with practical support and encouragement, we
can continue to build strong nations based on a healthy society with its
foundation of stable family life.
Ends.
*The Hon Kevin
Andrews MP has been a Member of the Australian Parliament since 1991. He served
as Australian Minister for Ageing (2001-03); Employment and Workplace Relations
(2003-07); and Immigration (2007). He was chair of the Parliamentary Committee
which published To have and to hold (1998)
Endnotes:
[1]
Kevin & Margaret Andrews (1997)
With this ring: Rebuilding a culture of marriage [Melbourne:
Threshold Publishing]
[2] Urie Bronfenbrenner (1994)
Address to an Australian Institute of Family Studies workshop,
Melbourne, July 1994.
[3] David Popenoe (1988)
Disturbing the nest [New York: Aldine de Gruyter] 7.
[4] See for example, David
Blankenhorn, “American family dilemmas’ in David Popenoe, Steven Bayne
and Jean Bethke Elshtain (1990) Rebuilding the nest [Milwaukee:
Family Service America]
[5] Popenoe,
op cit, 34
[6] See See Kevin Andrews (2000)
‘Family policies that work,’ Marriage, family & society issues 4:
31-35 for a previous discussion of policy responses.
[7] Cited in K Andrews (2009)
“Population, immigration and Australia’s future” The Australian
Polity 3: 12-16
[8]
Ibid
[9] Ibid
[10] Nicholas Eberstadt (2007)
“Global demographic outlook to 2025” Speech, Economic Conference
on Demography, Growth and Wellbeing , Zurich [Washington DC” American
Enterprise Institute]
[11] See John P Martin (2008)
International Migration Outlook [Paris: OECD]
[12] R Lesthaeghe , H Page and J
Surkyn (1988) Are immigrants substitutes for birth?
Inter-university programme in demography, working paper 1988-3
[Brussels: Inter-university]
[13] United Nations (2000)
Replacement migration: is it a solution to declining and ageing
populations? [Geneva and New York: Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, Population Division]
[14] Jonathan Grant et al (2004)
Low fertility and population ageing [Leiden, The Netherlands: Rand
Europe] 135
[15] See for example Samuel P
Huntington (2004) Who are we? [New York: Simon & Shuster]; and
Jonathan Sacks (2007) The home we build together [London:
Continuum]
[16] Graeme Hugo (2000) “Declining
fertility and policy intervention in Europe: some lessons for Australia”
Journal of Population Research, Nov 2000.
[17] M Murphy (1993) “The
contraceptive pill and women’s employment as factors in fertility change
in Britain 1963-1980: A challenge to the conventional view,’ Population Studies, 47: 221-243
[18] Rand Europe,
Op Cit, 31
[19] Hugo,
Op Cit.
[20] Saw Swee-Hock (1990) “Changes
in the fertility policy of Singapore,’ Institute of Policy Studies
Occasional Paper No 2 [Singapore: Times Academic Press]
[21] Hugo,
Op Cit.
[22] “Singapore, Hoping for a Baby
boom, Makes Sex a Civic Duty.” New York Times, April 21, 2001
[23] Singapore Department of
Statistics (2008) “Key demographic Indicators, 1970 – 2007,” Population Trends 2008
[24] Ralph Lattimore & Clinton
Pobke (2008) Recent trends in Australia’s fertility [Productivity
Commission: Canberra] 70 - 71
[25] Rand Europe,
Op cit.,
75
[26] Rand Europe,
Op cit.,
77-78
[27] Hugo,
Op cit.
[28] See for example, P McDonald
and R Kippen (2000) Population futures for Australia: The policy
alternatives, Research Paper No 5 [Parliamentary Library: Canberra]
4-5
[29] A Myrdal (1941)
Nation and
Family [New York: Harper] See David Popenoe (1988) Disturbing the
nest [New York: Aldine de Gruyter] for a discussion of Swedish
policy
[30] JM Hoem (1990) “Social policy
and recent fertility change in Sweden,” Population and Development
Review 16(4): 735 – 748 at 740-741
[31] HP Kohler (1999)
The
Swedish baby bomb and bust of 1985-1996. Revisited: the role of tempo,
quantum and variance effects. [Max Planck Institute for Demographic
Research]
[32] Swedish Institute (2003)
Factsheets on Sweden – the Swedish population
[33] L Jonsson (2003) “Fertiilty
changes and family policy in Sweden,” in M.-T Letablier and S Pennec
(eds) Changing family structure in Europe: new challenges for public
policy [Loughborough: European Research Centre]
[34] Jaane Haarland-Matlary, (1997)
Address to the Pastoral and Theological Congress, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
[35] Catherine Hakim (2000)
Work-Lifestyle choices in the 21st century [Oxford:
Oxford University Press]; Catherine Hakim (2002) Models of the family
in modern societies [London: Ashgate]; and Catherine Hakim (2004) Key issues in women’s work [London: Glasshouse Press]
[36] Centre for Social Justice
(2009) Every Family Matters [London: The Centre for Social
Justice] 20
[37] Tim Shipman “Only marriage can
mend broken Britain, says top judge in attack on ‘pass the partner’
society” (2009) Daily Mail [London].
[38] Steve Doughy (2008) “Family
life is in ‘meltdown’: Judge launches devastating attack on our
fractured society” Daily Mail [London]
[39] Quoted in Kathleen M Walters
(1997) “Marriage southern style” Threshold 57: 13-15
[40] To have and to hold,
supra,
50-51
[41] Institute of Marriage and
Family Canada (2009) Private choices, Public costs: How failing
families cost us all [Ottawa: The Institute]
[42] Relationships Foundation
(2008) When relationships go wrong: Counting the cost of family
failure [Cambridge: Relationships Foundation]
[43] Centre for Social Justice
(2009) Every family matters [London: The Centre]
[44] Alan J Hawkins (1999)
“Perspectives on Covenant Marriage” Marriage, Family & Society Issues,
3:14-20 See also: Steven L Nock, Laura A Sanchez & James D Wright (2008)
Covenant marriages: The movement to reclaim tradition in America
[New Brunswick NJ: Rutgers University Press]; Kathleen M Walters (1997)
‘Marriage southern style’ Threshold 57: 13-15
[45] Don Monkerud (2006) “Covenant
marriage on the rocks” <www.opednews.com>
[46] Kim Leon (2009) ‘Covenant
marriage: What is it and does it work?’ <www.missourifamilies.org>
[47] Steven L Nock, Laura A Sanchez
& James D Wright (2008) Covenant marriages: The movement to reclaim
tradition in America [New Brunswick NJ: Rutgers University Press]
See also A J Hawkins, SL Nock, JC Wilson L Sanchez & JD Wright (2002)
‘Attitudes about covenant marriage and divorce: Policy implications from
a three-state comparison’ Family Relations, 51: 166-175
[48] Amy Kirk (2007) “Committed to
constraints: A preliminary look at ten years of covenant marriage
rhetoric” Paper, American Sociological Association, New York.
[49] Quoted in Monkerud,
Op cit.
[50] Steven L Nock, Laura A Sanchez
& James D Wright (2008) Covenant marriages: The movement to reclaim
tradition in America [New Brunswick NJ: Rutgers University Press]
122
[51] Kevin & Margaret Andrews
(1997) With this ring: Rebuilding a culture of marriage
[Melbourne: Threshold Publishing] 42
[52] J Crawley (1986) “The
Attorney-General’s stable door: Marriage counselling services in
Australia” cited in K Andrews (1993) The provision of family services
[Canberra: Liberal and National Parties]
[53] Working Party on Marriage
Guidance (1979) Marriage Matters [London: HMSO] 3
[54] Committee on Procedure in
Matrimonial Causes (Denning Committee) (1947) Final Report, Cmnd
7024 [London: HMSO]
[55] Prior to this, state laws
prevailed, although the Australian Constitution gave the national
Parliament powers to enact laws pertaining to divorce and matrimonial
causes.
[56] Garfield Barwick (1959)
Hansard [Canberra: House of Representatives] 2225
[57]
Marriage Act 1961
[58] Departmental Committee on
Grants for the Development of Marriage Guidance (Haris Committee)
Report, (1948) Cmnd 7566 [London: HMSO]
[59] See
Matrimonial Causes Act
1959; Family Law Act 1975, ss 4(1) and 12
[60] Barwick,
Op cit.
[61] Kevin and Margaret Andrews
(1997) “Strategies to strengthen marriage: The Australian experience” in
Theodora Ooms (ed), Strategies to strengthen marriage: What do we
know? What do we need to know? [Washington DC: Family Impact
Seminar]. See also see Elizabeth van Acker (2008) Governments and
marriage education policy [Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave
Macmillan]
[62] Joint Select Committee on
Certain Aspects of the Operation and Interpretation of the Family Law
Act (1992) Certain Aspects of the Operation and Interpretation of the
Family Law Act [Canberra: Australian Parliament] para 4.97
[63] For an overview of these
developments, see Elizabeth van Acker (2008) Governments and marriage
education policy [Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan]
[64] To have and to hold,
supra,
111-207
[65] In 2007, 62.9 per cent of
marriages were performed by a civil celebrant. This figure includes
second and subsequent weddings which are largely performed by civil
celebrants. Approximately 22 per cent of weddings involved at least one
person who had married before : “Marriages, civil weddings up” (2008) Threshold 94: 18.
[66] Kevin Andrews (2009) “The
heart and soul of celebrancy” Threshold 96: 29
[67] Brian D Doss, Galena K
Rhoades, Scott M Stanley, Howard J Markman & Christine A Johnson (2009)
“Differential use of premarital education in first and second marriages”
Journal of Family Psychology 23(2): 268-273
[68] Kevin Andrews (2008)
“Governments and marriage education policy” Threshold 94: 28-29.
See also Elizabeth van Acker, supra, 202
[69] House of Representatives
Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs (2003) Every
picture tells a story [Canberra: Parliament of Australia]. Child
support, access and custody have been the subject of a series of
Parliamentary reports since the introduction of the Family Law Act
1975.
[70] John Howard (Prime Minister of
Australia) (2004) “Announcement of Family Law Package” Transcript of
Speech delivered at Anglicare Western Australia, Perth, 29 July,
quoted in Elizabeth van Acker, supra, 104
[71] For example: Daniel Patrick
Moynihan (1965) The negro family: The case for national action
[Washington DC: Office of Policy and Planning Research, US Department of
Labor]; National Commission on America’s Urban Families (1983)
Families First [Washington DC: US Government Printing Office]; US
National Commission on Children (1991) Beyond Rhetoric [
Washington DC: US Government Printing Office]
[72] For example: Daniel Patrick
Moynihan (1986) Family and Nation [San Diego: Harcourt Brace];
Council on Families in America (1995) Marriage in America [New
York: Council on Families]; David Blankenhorn (1995) Fatherless
America [New York: Basic Books]; David Blankenhorn, Jean Bethke
Elstain & Steven Bayne (eds) (1990) Rebuilding the Nest: A new
commitment to the American family [Milwaukee WI: Family Service
America]; David Popenoe (annually) The state of our unions [
Piscataway NJ: The National Marriage Project, Rutgers University]; Don
S Browing et al (1997) From culture wars to common ground
[Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press]; Allan C Carlson
(1990) Family questions: Reflections on the American social crisis
[New Brunswick: Transaction Books]; Theodore Ooms (ed) (1997) Strategies to strengthen marriage [Washington Dc; Family Impact
Seminar]; Institute for American Values (2000) The marriage movement:
A statement of principles [New York: IAV]; Institute for American
Values (2002) Why marriage matters: Twenty-one conclusions from the
social sciences [New York: IAV]
[73] Hilary Clinton , It takes a
village, supra
[74] William Galston (1996)
Divorce American-style, Council on Families in American Working
Paper No 49 [New York: Institute for American Values]
[75]
Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families Act [TANF]
[76] Elizabeth van Acker,
supra,
chapter 5
[77] For example, Diane Sollee the
founder and director of the grassroots Coalition for Marriage, Family
and Couples Education and Smart Marriages.com which acts as a daily
clearing house for information about marriage, and conducts the annual
Smartmarriages conference. <www.smartmarriages.com>
[78] For example, Allan Carlson,
David Popenoe, David Blankenhorn Don Browning, Paul Amato, Barbara Dafoe
Whitehead, and Linda Waite.
[79] Notably John Gottman at the
Seattle Marital and Family Institute and author of a series of books
including (1999) The seven principles for making marriage work
[New York: Crown] and Howard Markman & Scott Stanley at the University
of Denver, authors of a series of books including Fighting for your
marriage [San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1994] and the PREP marital
education program.
[80] Including the Institute for
American Values, the Family Research Council, the Heritage Foundation,
the Family, Religion and Culture Project at the University of Chicago
[81] For example: M Scott Peck
(1978) The road less travelled [New York: Random House];
Harville Hendrix (1988) Getting the love you want [New York:
Simon & Shuster ]; John Gray ( 2004 ) Men are from Mars and Women
are from Venus [New York: Harper]; Michele Weiner-Davis (1992) Divorce busting [New York: Summit Books]
[82] “Death of a marriage education
pioneer’ (2008) Threshold 94: 32. The Maces were active in
establishing the National Marriage Guidance Council in the UK before
moving to the US where they founded the Association for Couples in
Marriage Enrichment [ACME]. They advised the Australian government in
the 1950s about marriage support programs.
[83] David and Vera Mace became
joint Executive Directors of the American Association of Marriage
Counselors (now AAMFT) and provided training in many countries for
various organisations, including the UN Institute for the Family. They
published numerous articles. Their best known book is How to have a
happy marriage [Nashville: Abington Press, 1977]
[84] There are many examples. The
US Catholic Bishops’ Conference has initiated a “For your marriage”
program comprising a website, billboards, media spots across the
country.
www.foryourmarriage.com David and Claudia Arp, founders of Marriage
Alive conduct seminars and conferences throughout the US and
internationally. <
www.marriagealive.org > Bill Doherty, a past president of the
National Council on Family Relations, has promoted community family
initiatives.
[85] For example, dioceses of the
Catholic Church adopted a ‘Common Marriage Policy’ from the early 1970s:
National Conference of Catholic Bishops (1988) Faithful to each other
forever [Washington DC: NCCB]; and many churches offered marriage
preparation programs, including the use of the pre-marital inventories
PREPARE and FOCCUS.
[86] Michael J McManus (1993)
Marriage savers: Helping your friends and family avoid divorce
[Grand Rapids MI: Zondervan] 302-306
[87] Personal communication with
Mike McManus, July 2009.
[88] P J Birch, S E Weed & J Olsen
(2004) “Assessing the impact of community marriage policies on county
divorce rates” Family Relations 53(5): 495-503
[89]
Ibid.
[90] Personal communication with
Mike McManus, July 2009
[91] Birch et al,
supra, 501
[92] Other community initiatives
include First Things First – W Doherty & J Anderson (2004) “Community
marriage initiatives” Family Relations 53: 425-432, and the
Oklahoma Marriage Initiative – Elizabeth van Acker, supra, 143
[93] Many of the pre 1998 studies
are summarised in ‘To have and to hold’ supra, 129-125.
[94] M H Butler & K S Wampler
(1999) “A meta-analytic update of research on the Couple Communication
program,” The American Journal of Family Therapy 27: 223-237; J
S Carroll & W J Doherty (2003) “Evaluating the effectiveness of
premarital prevention programs: A meta-analytic review of outcome
research,” Family Relations 52: 105-118; T L Hight (2000) “Do
the rich get richer? A meta-analysis of the methodological and
substantive moderators of couple enrichment” (Doctoral dissertation,
Virginia Commonwealth University) Dissertation Abstracts
International 65: 3278B; and J Reardon-Anderson, M Stagner, J E
Macomber & J Murray (2005) Systematic review of the impact of
marriage and relationship programs [Washington DC: Urban Institute]
[95] A J Hawkins, V L Blanchard, S
A Baldwin & E B Fawcett (2008) “Does marriage and relationship education
work? A meta-analytic study” Journal of Consulting and Clinical
Psychology 76: 723-734
[96] V L Blanchard, A J Hawkins, S
A Baldwin & E B Fawcett (2009) “investigating the effects of marriage
and relationships education on couples’ communication skills: A
meta-analytic study” Journal of Family Psychology 23(2): 203-214
[97] H Glezer (1994) ‘Family
backgrounds and marital breakdown’ Threshold 43: 16–19.
[98] E Masur (1993)
‘Developmental differences in children’s understanding of marriage,
divorce and remarriage’ Journal of
Applied Developmental Psychology 14: 191–212; P Amato (1988)
‘Parental divorce and attitudes toward marriage and family life’ Journal of Marriage and the Family
50: 453–461; P Amato (1997)
‘Explaining the intergenerational transmission of divorce’ Threshold
54: 15–27; and DB Larson et al (1996) The Costly Consequences of
Divorce [Rockville MD: National Institute for Healthcare Research]
and the studies cited therein.
[99] DB Larson (1996)
supra
and the studies cited therein.
[100] TC Martin & LL
Bumpass (1989) ‘Recent trends in marital disruption’ Demography 26: 37–51; AJ Norton & PC Glick (1979) ‘Marital instability in America:
Past, present and future’ in G Levinger & OC Moles (eds) Divorce and
Separation: Context, Causes, and Consequences [New York: Basic
Books]; and SL Nock (1987) The Sociology of the Family [Englwood
Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall]
[101] Mark Regnerus (2009) “Say
yes. What are you waiting for?” Washington Post (April 26)
[102] “Early living together,
marriage, parenting benefits some young adults” (2008) News Release,
Penn State University, (March 28) Se also Kevin Andrews (1996) “The age
for marriage” Threshold 54: 10-11
[103] Malenie Christiansen (2009)
“More de factos end up divorcing after saying I do” Courier Mail
(Brisbane) July 17, p 9.
[104] Paul Amato (2004) “Tension
between institutional and individual views of marriage.” Journal of
Marriage and Family 66: 959-965
[105] Amato,
supra, 963
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